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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRONXVILLE FACILITIES SUPPORT STAFF, 
• ,' Petitioner, 
-and- • CASE NO. C-6043 
BRONXVILLE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
( . A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair • 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the. Bronxville Facilities Support Staff has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
1During the process of the petition, the incumbent employee organization, the Bronxville 
Teachers Association, Facilities Unit, NYSUT, AFT, disclaimed any interest in . 
continuing to represent the petitioned-for unit. 
Certification - C-6043 - 2 - . 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.. 
Included: All employees in the positions of Custodian, Head Cleaner, 
Messenger and Watch People/Security. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Bronxville Facilities Support Staff. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 27, 2011 
Albany, New York 
{Awhu^ 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Gfrairman 
Sheila S. Cofe, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNIONDALE PUBLIC LIBRARY STAFF 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6052 
UNIONDALE PUBLIC LIBRARY," 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, " 
IT IS,HEREBY CERTIFIED that.the Uniondale Public Library Staff Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-6052 - 2 -
Included: All regular full-time and part-time employees in the titles of 
Librarian III, Librarian II, Librarian I, Senior Typist Clerk, Typist 
Clerk, Senior Library Clerk, Clerk, Clerk Bi-Lingual, Page and 
Cleaner. J 
Excluded: The Library Director, Senior Account Clerk, Senior Typist Clerk who 
works directly for the Library Director, Guard, part-time substitute 
Clerk and part-time substitute Librarian I and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Uniondale Public Library Staff Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to. a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: .May 27, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole- Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATROLMAN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF SOUTHAMPTON TOWN, INC., 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. CP-1168 
- and -
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
Employer. 
GREENBERG BURZICHELLI GREENBERG P.C. (SETH H. GREENBERG & 
GENEVIEVE E. PEEPLES of counsel), for Petitioner 
LAW OFFICE OF VINCENT TOOMEY (VINCENT TOOMEY & JAMIEE L. 
POCCHIARI of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of Southampton Town, Inc. (PBA) and cross-exceptions filed by the Town 
of Southampton (Town) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1 The ALJ's 
decision dismissed a PBA petition seeking to place the position-of part-time/seasonal 
police officer (PSPO) into a unit of full-time police officers of the Town already. 
represented by PBA based upon a conflict of interests caused by some full-time police 
officers supervising the PSPOs. 
In the decision, the ALJ rejected other bases raised by the Town for dismissing 
1
 43 PERB H4001(2010). 
Case No, CP-1168. - 2 -
the petition including the undisputed fact that PBA's constitution and bylaws exclude 
PSPOs from membership. The ALJ reasoned that it could not be presumed "that the 
PBA will not fairly represent the PSPOs or that a potential conflict of interest exists 
solely based upon their exclusion from membership."2 The ALJ also rejected the 
Town's argument that: "a conflict of interest exists between the PSPOs and unit 
employees because of the PBA's longstanding efforts to limit the Town's employment of 
PSPO's, [determining that:] those actions occurred when the PSPOs were not in the 
PBA's unit and the PBA had no duty to represent them."3 The Town filed cross-
exceptions to the two above-quoted conclusions of the ALJ. 
1
 " FACTS 
The applicable facts are set forth in the'ALJ's'decision and are repeated here 
only as necessary to decide the exceptions and cross-exceptions. 
Since the mid-1980's, PBA has engaged in one lawsuit, filed several grievances 
and negotiated provisions in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Town, 
which placed restrictions on the terms and conditions of employment of PSPOs. In 
addition, during negotiations following the filing of the PBA's petition, its spokesman 
advised the Town that it could save a substantial amount of money by "getting rid of" 
the PSPOs. 
PBA's constitution and bylaws declare PSPOs to be ineligible for membership. 
PBA president Aube testified that if PBA's petition is granted, the PBA membership 
2
 Supra, note 1,43 PERB 1J4001 at p. 4008. 
3
 Supra, note 2. 
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would "go ahead and change the by-laws so that the language in it reflects the 
admittance of them." However, he acknowledged that such a change would require a 
favorable two-thirds vote by the PBA members at its annual meeting in April or by a 
favorable three-quarters vote by mail, and that he could not predict the outcome. He 
also acknowledged that during the pendency of its petition, PBA members voted on 
amendments to the constitution and by-laws but a change in PBA membership eligibility 
was not one of the proposals presented.. ; 
DISCUSSION 
We reject the ALJ's conclusion that the categorical exclusion of PSPOs from 
membership in PBA is not a sufficient reason for dismissing PBA's petition. In City 
School District of the City of"White Plains,4 we held: 
No employee organization may be certified to 
represent a unit if it refuses to admit some of the 
employees within such unit to membership. ~ 
Later, after the Act was amended to grant the Board improper practice jurisdiction, we 
found that it was not improper for a recognized or certified employee organization to 
revoke an individual employee's membership in that organization for cause, such as 
supporting a rival organization, because the "Board is not the forum to regulate the 
internal affairs of an employee organization."5 That proposition is not inconsistent with 
our uniting decision in City School District of the City of White Plains,6 where we 
4
 2 PERB 1J3009 at p. 3271 (1969). 
5
 CSEA (Bogack), 9 PERB 1J3064 at p. 3110 (1976). 
6
 Supra, note 4. 
Case No. CP-1168 4 -
concluded that a categorical exclusion of a class of employees from membership in an 
employee organization is sufficient reason to dismiss that employee organization's 
petition to accrete those employees to the organization. -
Having found that PBA's current prohibition against PSPOs becoming PBA , 
members is a sufficient reason for denying PBA's petition, we need not consider whether 
the 20-year history of PBA's adversarial position regarding PSPO's, standing alone, is a 
sufficient reason for us to find a conflict of interest warranting dismissal of the petition. 
We also need not consider PBA's exceptions to the ALJ's finding that the supervision 
exercised by PBA unit employees over PSPOs is sufficient to constitute a conflict of 
interests, given the fragmentation of supervisory officers from the PBA unit.7 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and hereby, is 
dismissed. 
DATED: May 27, 2011. 
Albany, New York 
sAZ^ 
S Sheila S. Cole, Member 
7
 Town of Southampton, 42 PERB 1J4018 (2008), 43 PERB P000.15 (2010). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 237, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28429 
- and - • 
TOWN OF ISLIP, 
Respondent. 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (BARRY J. PEEK & RANDI M. 
MELNICK of counsel), for Charging Party 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (ERNEST R. STOLZER & AMY M. CULVER 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
• • ( 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Islip (Town) and cross-
r 
exceptions by Local 237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Local 237) to a 
decision1 by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge, as amended, by Local 237 
alleging that the Town violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employmeht Act 
(Act) when it revoked the assignment of vehicles to employees in the Local 237-
represented unit. 
The ALJ found that the Town's action violated §209ra. 1 (d) of the Act because it 
constitutes a unilateral change of an 18-year old past practice of assigning vehicles on a 
1
 43 PERB H4514(2010). 
Case No. U-28429 -2-
permanent basis to unit employees represented by Local 237. The ALJ, however, 
dismissed that portion of Local 237's amended charge that alleged that the Town had 
refused to negotiate the impact of the unilateral change. 
The Town's Exceptions 
The Nature of the Past Practice 
The Town asserts that it had authorized the use of Town vehicles by unit 
employees subject to certain conditions precedent; the employee is on call 24/7 or is 
assigned to multiple sites; and that such assignments were approved by the Town 
Supervisor. As to the last of these, PERB has held that "the extended period of the 
practice...constituted circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie proof of 
the employer's knowledge, thereby imposing upon the [Town] the burden of proof of 
demonstrating that...it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the past practice."2 
Inasmuch as the Town introduced no evidence to demonstrate that the Town Supervisor 
lacked actual or constructive knowledge, we conclude that he, and his predecessors, if 
any, over an 18-year period, knew of the practice and, by their silence, condoned it. 
As to the two other conditions precedent, the vehicles were afforded to 
approximately 45 unit employees for limited personal use, commuting to and from work, 
but not for other personal uses such as transporting family members. The Town argues 
that it has the managerial prerogative to revoke the personal vehicle use by employees 
because its responsibility to maximize fiscal efficiencies outweighs the interests of those 
2
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB ^3012 at 3047' (2007)(subsequent history 
omitted). See also, City of Oswego, 41 PERBP011 (2008). 
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unit employees whose past use of Town vehicles was terminated. 
The Town's argument misconstrues the applicable law. The Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department sustained a prior PERB holding that economic benefits, including 
employee use of an employer's vehicle, are the quintessence of mandatory subjects of 
negotiations, stating: "PERB's determination that employee use of an employer-owned car 
for personal purposes is an economic benefit and a term and condition of employment ' 
which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn is reasonable and supported by substantial 
evidence."3 Two years later, the Appellate Division, Second Department sustained another 
PERB decision that reached the same conclusion.4 
The Town Code and Administrative Procedure Act 
The Town claims that it has a statutory right to revoke the 18-year old past practice, 
Its argument is premised upon a 1968 Town Code provision, which was supplemented by 
a Town Vehicle Policy adopted by the Town unilaterally on April 29, 2008 and put into 
effect on June 9, 2008. In addition, it relies upon its 1990 Administrative Procedure 
Manual provision dealing with Town vehicle usage. We reject this argument. 
The 1968 Town Code provision states: 
§14-12. Use of Town-owned equipment or property. 
No officer or employees shall request or permit the use of 
Town-owned vehicles, equipment, material orproperty for 
3
 County of Onondaga, 12 PERB 1J3035 (1979), confd County of Onondaga v New York 
State Pub Empl RelBd, 77 AD2d 783, 783-4, 13 PERB 1J7011 at 7022 (4* Dept 1980). 
4
 County of Nassau, 13 PERB fl3095 (1980), confd County of Nassau v New York State 
Pub EmplRelBd, 14 PERB 1J7017 (Sup Ct Nassau County 1981) affd, 87 AD2d 1006, 15 
PERB TJ7012 (2d Dept 1982), app denied 57 NY2d 601, 15 PERB 1J7015 (1982). 
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personal convenience or profit, except when such services 
are available to the public generally or are provided as 
municipal policy for the use of such officer or employee in 
the conduct of official business. 
Whether the Town Code provision has any applicability, it is clearly not an 
authorization for the Town's unilateral action in the present case. A local law is invalid to 
the extent that it precludes collective negotiations that are mandated by the Act,5 and a 
unilateral change to a mandatory subject by an employer is a violation of its duty to 
negotiate in good faith, actions by its legislative body notwithstanding.6 In addition, when 
, an enforceable practice is inconsistent with an employer's preexisting rule, the employer 
can no longer rely upon that policy to unilaterally end or modify the practice without 
violating §209-a.1(d) of the Act.7 A fortiori, the Town's reliance on its Administrative 
Procedure Manual provisions is unavailing. 
Conditions for Use of Town Vehicles to Commute to Work 
The Town Code and Administrative Manual set forth conditions limiting the 
authorization of unit employees using Town vehicles to commute to work. Inasmuch as 
the use of Town vehicles to commute is an economic benefit, it is a mandatory subject 
despite those conditions. The Town, therefore, cannot change the past practice absent an 
agreement with Local 237. Here, the Town did not even seek such an agreement, which 
5
 Doyle v-City of Troy, 51 AD2d 845, 9 PERB 117510 (3d Dept 1976). 
6
 Saratoga Springs Cent Sch Dist, 11 PERB 1J3037 (1978) confirmed sub nom Saratoga 
Springs Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 68 AD2d 202, 12 PERB 1J7008 
(3d Dept 1979), Iv denied, 47 NY2d 711, 12 PERB fl7012 (1979). 
7
 V7//age ofCatskill, 43 PERB 1J3001 (2010). 
Case No. U-28429
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Is a condition precedent under the Act for making a change involving a mandatory subject. 
Town Equipment 
The Town asserts that just as PERB. has held that it is a management prerogative 
for a public employer to restrict its police officers from carrying weapons while working, we 
should also hold it to be an employer's prerogative to reallocate vehicles. The Town 
reasons that they are both equipment. That is a faulty analogy. The basis of our decision 
regarding weapons was that such equipment relates directly to the manner and means by 
which police services are provided to its constituency. The allocation of vehicles for 
employees personal use does not.8 
Accordingly, we deny the Town's exceptions. 
Local 237's Cross-Exceptions 
impact Negotiations 
Local 237's first exception states that the ALJ erred in finding that it failed to 
establish that it made a demand to bargain the'impact of the Town's unilateral 
discontinuation of a past practice. That is a misreading of the ALJ's decision, which 
states: "Local 237's proof fails to establish that it made a demand to bargain impact and 
that that was rejected."9 (emphasis added) Indeed, the ALJ correctly found that the Town 
The Town cites to an ALJ decision, which held that the provision of bullet proof vests to 
police officers is a non-mandatory subject of negotiation. However, when the subject 
came before the Board for the first time in City of New York, 40 PERB tf3017 (2007), we 
determined that the subject is mandatorily negotiable. 
Supra, note 1, 43 PERB 1J4514 at 4561. 
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offered to negotiate the impact in a June 6, 2008 letter to Local 237.10 On June 9, 2008, 
Local 237 responded with a letter to the Town demanding impact negotiations. The record 
evidence demonstrates that following this exchange of letters, neither party raised the 
issue again. Based upon these facts and circumstances, we conclude that Local 237 has 
failed to prove that.the Town refused to bargain the impact of its decision. 
Withdrawal of Town's Negotiation. Proposal. 
Local 237 excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that it failed to present sufficient 
evidence to find that the. Town engaged in bad faith bargaining when it withdrew its vehicle 
use proposal during the course of collective negotiations. Although the Town's unilateral 
change in its vehicle policy violates §209-a.1 (d) of the Act, we find that the facts presented 
in this record do not demonstrate that the Town's withdrawal of its proposal constitutes a 
separate and distinct violation of §209-a.1.(d). The evidence reveals that the Town 
withdrew its proposal based upon an erroneous belief that the change was a managerial 
prerogative. 
Accordingly, we deny Local 237's cross-exceptions. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's decision finding that the Town 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Town shall: 
1. Forthwith restore the vehicle assignments for commutation between home 
and work to those unit members who enjoyed the benefit prior to April 4, 2008; 
2. Forthwith make whole unit employees for the extra expenses incurred as a • 
Supra, note 1, 43 PERB 1J4514 at 4563, n. 33. 
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result of the unilateral withdrawal of the vehicle assignment(s), if any, together with interest 
at the maximum legal rate; and 
3. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: May 27, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Mcntu^ 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
<2^ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Islip, in the unit represented by Local 
237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, that the Town will forthwith: 
1. Restore, the vehicle assignments for commutation between home and work, to 
those unit members who enjoyed the benefit prior to April 4, 2008; 
2. Make whole unit employees for the extra expenses.incurred as a result of the 
~ unilateral withdrawal of the vehicle assignment(s), if any, together with interest at 
the. maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
On behalf of the Town of Islip 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other.material. j 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF CANTON, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-29658 
- and -
CANTON POLICE ASSOCIATION, • • j ' 
Respondent. 
DANIEL C. McKILLIP, for Charging Party 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Canton Police 
Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the Village of Canton (Village) alleging that the 
Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
submitting a proposal with respect to a nonmandatory subject of negotiations to 
compulsory interest arbitration. 
Based upon a stipulated record, the ALJ concluded that the Village's charge was 
timely filed and that the at-issue proposal was nonmandatory.1 The Association has 
filed exceptions to both of these conclusions. The Village supports the ALJ's decision 
1
 43 PERB ^4597(2010). 
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and also asserts that the Association's exceptions are untimely pursuant to §213.2 of 
the Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
FACTS 
The Village and the Association are parties to a collectively negotiated 




Section 1. The work schedule shall be bid by seniority on an annual basis 
commencing no earlier than November 1s t and completed by November 15th of 
each year, to be effective January 1st. Thereafter, by seniority, those employees . 
who are scheduled for the "B" and "C" lines shall select (2) twenty-eight (28) day 
tours of duty on the "A" Line (or "D" line if staffed) for that calendar year. The 
employees on the "A" line (or "D" line if staffed) at that time, may switch with that 
employee coming to the "A" line (or "D" line if staffed) as set herein. The 
Department shall make its best effort to ensure that the affected employees(s) 
shall not be required to work sixteen (16) consecutive hours in making the tour of 
duty.switch. To avoid having an employee work sixteen (16) consecutive hours, 
the Chief of Police may elect to waive an eight (8) hour tour, that the employee 
will make up on a later date at the Chief of Police's discretion. The work 
schedule shall be posted no later than December 21s t of each year, and remain 
unaltered for the entire calendar year (January through December) except as 
may be set forth below and shall consist of the following tours of duty: 
"A" Line - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. 
"B"Line - 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
"C'Line - 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. 
"D" Line - 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. 
The "A", "B" and "C" lines shall be staffed first. The "D" line is an 
optional tour of duty and shall be staffed and bid, as set forth above, after the 
"A", "B" and "C" lines have been staffed. The "D" line may be used pursuant to 
Section 2 herein. 
Section 2. All employees shall remain on their, bidded annual work schedule 
and shall not be removed to avoid the payment of overtime, except due to an • 
emergency as defined by statute, time off for vacation, Holiday, patrol coverage 
or training, with notice being provided to the employee at least twenty-eight (28) 
calendar days prior to the change by the Chief of Police or designee. There shall 
Case No. U-29658 - 3 -
not be more than a total of fifty (50) tour of duty changes for the entire unit each 
calendar year (January through December). All personal leave or sick leave use 
shall be covered through overtime. 
An employee requesting time off who provides twenty-eight (28) 
calendar days notice or more shall not be unreasonably denied and the Chief of 
Police or designee shall make their best effort to grant the request. In the event 
a request is less than twenty-eight (28) calendar days, the Chief of Police or 
designee may deny such request. In that event, the employee may "switch" or 
"swap" his/her tour of duty with another employee, as set forth in Section 5 
herein. 
Section 3. In the event a vacancy in title occurs, the Village shall fill that 
vacancy within a reasonable time thereafter. 
Section 4. Employee schedules can be changed with notice if the purpose is 
to give another employee time off for vacation, Holiday or optional training time. 
Requests for time off for personal leave, mandatory training or sick time will be 
paid through overtime. 
Section 5. Each employee retains the right to "switch" or "swap" his/her 
tour of duty with another employee, without restriction, subject to the approval of 
the Chief of Police, which shall not be unreasonably denied. 
On November 17, 2009, the Association filed and served a petition seeking to 
have the parties' impasse referred to compulsory interest arbitration. Among the 
Association's proposals in the petition for compulsory interest arbitration were the 
deletion of sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 and the addition of a new section 6 in Article 34 of the 
expired agreement: \ 
New Section 6 - Two (2) employees shall be scheduled and working 
between the hours of 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. every Tuesday and Saturday. 
On November 19, 2009, the Village received the Association's petition. On the 
same day, the Village was notified by our Office of Conciliation that the Village's 
response to the petition was due on or before December 4, 2009. The Village served 
and filed on December 2, 2009, its response to the petition and an improper practice 
charge alleging that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by submitting the 
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new Section 6 proposal to interest arbitration. The Village, however, withdrew its initial 
response to the petition and served and filed a different response on December 4, 
2009. 
The Association filed an answer to the charge asserting as an affirmative 
defense that the charge is untimely because it was not filed within ten working days of 
receipt of the petition and it was not filed simultaneously with the Village's response to 
the petition. 
DISCUSSION . 
We begin with the Village's contention that the Association's exceptions to the 
ALJ's decision are untimely. Pursuant to §213.2(a) of the Rules, exceptions must be 
filed within 15 working days after receipt of an ALJ's decision. In the present case, the 
Association received the ALJ's decision on October 22, 2010, and filed its exceptions 
on November 12, 2010. Excluding the date that the decision was received by the 
Association, as we must, the exceptions are timely and therefore properly before us.2 
Next, we turn to the Association's procedural argument that the Village's charge 
is untimely pursuant to §205.6(b) of the Rules because it was not filed simultaneously 
with the Village's response. 
In rejecting the Association's timeliness defense, the ALJ correctly cited City of 
Elmira3 (Elmira), where the Board stated clearly and unequivocally that: 
In relevant respect, §§205.5(a) and 205.6(b) of our Rules 
together require an improper practice charge raising a [sic] 
objection to the arbitrability of a demand to be filed at or 
before the time the response to the petition for interest 
2
 New York CityBd ofEducand UFT (Jenkins), 28 PERB.1J3058 (1995). 
325PERBP072(1992). 
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arbitration is filed.4 
Our interpretation of §205.6(b) of the Rules in Elmira is fully consistent with the 
explicit terms of the Rule, which states that a charge by a respondent "may not be filed 
after the date of the filing of the response." (emphasis added) 
Nevertheless, the Association's brief in support of its exceptions does not 
reference the wording of §206.5(b) of the Rules or cite and distinguish Elmira. Instead 
the Association's entire argument is premised upon the thin reed of an obvious 
misstatement contained in the following footnote in South Nyack/Grand View Joint 
Police Administration Board:5 
Notwithstanding the Assistant Directors [sic] determination, 
§205.6(c) of our Rules requires that a petition for declaratory 
ruling may not be .filed after the date of the filing of the 
•| response to the petition for interest arbitration. The Police 
Board's January 9, 2002 filing of the declaratory ruling petition 
on PERB's form was not, therefore, timely as it was not filed 
simultaneously with its response to the PBA's petition.6 
(emphasis added) 
Based upon the explicit terms of the applicable Rule and our decision in Elmira, the 
Association's reliance on this footnote is without any merit. 
In the present case, the charge is timely because it was filed on December 2, 
2010, two days prior to the date when the Village was obligated to file its response. 
The Village's withdrawal of its initial response and the filing of a different response on 
December 4, 2010, did not affect the timeliness of the charge under §206.5(b) of the 
Rules. 
4
 Supra, note 3,25 PERB P072 at 3148. 
5
 35 PERB p 0 0 7 (2002). 
6
 Supra, note 5,35 PERBP007 at 3015, n. 3. . 
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Finally, we examine the Association's assertion that the at-issue demand should 
be treated as a mandatory subject based upon the conversion theory of negotiability 
first adopted in City of Cohoes7(Cohoes). Under Cohoes, a nonmandatory subject 
contained in a collectively negotiated agreement is converted into a mandatory subject 
between the parties to that agreement. 
In Town of Fishkill Police Fraternity, Inc,8 (Fishkill) we applied the Cohoes 
conversion theory in finding that a proposal seeking to establish minimum staffing for 
each tour of duty was mandatory because it sought to modify a nonmandatory provision 
in an agreement, which granted the employer the sole discretion to designate "tours of 
duty, and the number of officers per tour."9 
In City of New Yor/c,10 we expressly rejected the argument, however) that a 
nonmandatory proposal is converted into a mandatoryone merely because it seeks to 
modify a mandatory term in an expired agreement: 
We are not persuaded that there is any rationale 
under the Act for the expansion of the Cohoes 
conversion theory that would transform nonmandatory 
subjects not already contained in an agreement into 
mandatory subjects. Unlike the negotiating disparity 
that the Board sought to remedy in Cohoes, no 
structural imbalance exists between the parties with 
respect to the negotiability of nonmandatory subjects 
outside of an agreement. Neither an employer nor an 
employee organization is obligated to negotiate such a 
subject and they are mutually impacted when a 
nonmandatory subject is incorporated into an 
7
 31 PERB 1J3020 (1998) (subsequent history omitted). 
8
 39 PERB fi3035 (2006). 
9
 39 PERB P035 at 3115. 
1040 PERB 1J3017 (2007) (subsequently history omitted). 
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agreement: it is converted, as a matter of law, into a 
mandatory subject to subsequent negotiations.11 
In the present case, the Association asserts that its proposal is mandatory under 
Fishkill because the proposal seeks to modify Article 34, §1 with respect to the Village's 
discretion to staff the optional "D" line from 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. We disagree. Unlike 
the nonmandatory contract provision in Fishkill, which granted the employer the 
discretion to determine the number of officers to work each tour, Article 34, §1 gives the 
Village the option to schedule a fourth line, a mandatory subject. This section of the 
parties' present agreement is not a minimum staffing provision or a provision granting 
the Village the contractual discretion to determine the number of staff members to work 
a particular shift. Therefore, as the ALJ correctly concluded, the Association's 
nonmandatory proposal is not sufficiently related to a nonmandatory subject in the 
parties' agreement, which is subject to.conversion under Cohoes. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Association withdraw its 
proposal. 
DATED: May 27, 2010 ^ ^ 
Albany, New York A ^ Jf rX • 
Jerome Lefkfrwitz, Chairman 
<2_ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
11
 Supra, note 10, 40 PERB P017 at 3066. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
n ___ _ _ _ ^ ^ ; 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27431 
- and -
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JUANITA PEREZ WILLIAMS (NANCY J. LARSON of counsel), for 
Respondent 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Syracuse (City) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed 
by the Civil Service Employees Association', Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) alleging that the City violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed the existing residency requirement 
by mandating current unit employees to be domiciled in the City and by unilaterally 
imposing a requirement on employees to submit a residency affidavit setting forth 
specific information along with the production of documents including tax returns and 
bank statements. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that that the City 
) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally imposed the residency affidavit 
requirement, and dismissed the remainder of the charge. The ALJ's remedial order 
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directed the City to discontinue the use of the residency affidavit, remove and destroy 
all reports and other documents emanating from that requirement, reinstate and make 
whole any unit employees who were terminated as the result of the affidavit 
requirement, and sign and post a notice.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the City asserts that the residency affidavit requirement 
constitutes a prohibited subject of negotiations based upon the terms of the City 
Charter. In the alternative, the City contends that the new requirement is nonmandatory 
because residency is a qualification of employment, the affidavit is not a substantial 
change from its,prior practice, and the affidavit is only required when the City.is 
investigating the residency status of unit employees. Finally, the City excepts to the 
ALJ's proposed remedial order. CSEA supports the decision of the ALJ. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The applicable facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated 
here only as necessary to address the City's exceptions. 
While the City Charter was originally enacted by the Legislature in 1885,2 the 
residency requirement in the current Charter was enacted by the City in 1960. Section 
8-112.2 of that Charter states: 
Employees of the city shall be at the time of their 
appointment and continue to be during their continuance in 
1
 43 PERB TJ4565(2010). 
2
 L 1885, c 26, 423 South Salina Street, Inc. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, n. 5 
(1986). •• • ' -
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the employment of the city, residents of the city of Syracuse 
. except as otherwise provided by law, local rule or ordinance 
of the council. 
Since 1990, the City has actively sought to enforce its residency requirement. 
Commencing in 1992, the City implemented a residency monitoring program, which 
mandated each employee to prepare, sign and submit, on a regular basis, a 
certification form attesting to his or her residence. In 2001, the City modified the 
monitoring program by changing the certification form to mandate that an employee 
acknowledge that he or she understands the residency requirement. 
Under the monitoring program, a City investigation is commenced when the City 
Office of Personnel and Labor Relations suspects that an employee is not in 
compliance with the residency requirement. As part of the City's investigation, an 
employee is offered three options: submit "acceptable proof of City residency; obtain a 
residency waiver; or restore City residency and provide a notice of address change. 
The forms of "acceptable proof" of residency include documents such as mortgage 
statements, rental agreements, and utility bills. In addition, at least two unit employees 
submitted sworn statements from others to demonstrate City residence. 
In February 2007, the City began requiring unit members suspected of violating 
the residency requirement to sign and submit a sworn twelve-paragraph Affidavit of City 
Residency (residency affidavit). The residency affidavit supplements the certification of 
residency that all City employees are required to file. The affidavit mandates sworn 
responses from an employee with respect to his or her residency, voter registration,. 
parentage of school-age children, schools attended by those children, the address 
where personal, mail is received and whether the employee has applied and received a 
property tax exemption under the STAR program. In addition, the residency affidavit 
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requires the employee to submit five forms of documentation: proof of a mortgage or a 
rental; federal and state income tax returns for the prior two years with confidential 
information redacted; two bank statements with confidential information redacted; and a 
New York State driver's license and/or a vehicle registration. If an employee is unable 
to fully satisfy those documentation requirements, he or she must submit a sworn 
explanation. The employee must also swear that the documents submitted were not 
obtained under false pretenses or altered. Finally, the residency affidavit requires the 
employee to swear to the following: 
I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT ANY STATEMENT IN 
THIS AFFIDAVIT MAY BE USED IN AN EMPLOYMENT 
TERMINATION HEARING OR ANY OTHER PROCEEDING 
PERTAINING TO MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY. 
DISCUSSION 
Contrary to the City's contention, the residency affidavit requirement is not a 
prohibited subject of negotiations under Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City 
of New York, Inc. v New York State Public Employment Relations Board3 (hereinafter, 
NYCPBA). - In NYCPBA, the Court of Appeals held that a special state police . 
disciplinary law that pre-dates Civ Ser Law §§75 and 76 and grants local officials the 
power and authority over police discipline preempts the negotiability of police discipline 
under the Act.4 In the present case, the City Charter residency provision was hot 
enacted by the Legislature, it is not a police disciplinary provision subject to Civ Ser Law 
§76.4 and it is silent with respect to the applicable procedures for enforcing the 
3
 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB U7006 (2006). 
4
 City of Albany, 42 PERB 1J3005 (2009); Tarrytown PBA, 40 PERB 1J3024 (2007). 
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residency requirement. Furthermore, the City has not identified a state public policy 
that is strong enough to exclude the residency affidavit from collective negotiations 
under the Act.5 Therefore, we find no merit to the City's prohibition argument. 
The City's argument that the residency affidavit is a nonmandatory subject under 
the Act is equally without merit. The affidavit requirement is applicable to current 
employees under investigation and cannot be reasonably construed as an employment 
qualification. In addition, in City of Schenectady,6 we held that the unilateral imposition 
of a residency affidavit requirement on unit members constituted a mandatory subject of 
negotiations because it was a substantial change in their terms and conditions of. 
employment. We reach the same conclusion in the present case. 
Although unit members have been required to participate in recordkeeping with 
respect to residency since 1992, including submitting "acceptable proof" of residency 
upon the City's request, the new affidavit requirement constitutes a substantial change 
in the form and substance of recordkeeping delegated by the City to unit members. 
Under the new requirement, an employee may be obligated to pay a notary fee 
to obtain the necessary notarization of the affidavit. Furthermore, the requirement of 
sworn factual statements may make an employee vulnerable to criminal prosecution 
under the Penal Law if it is alleged that the affidavit contains a false statement. The 
affidavit requirement also raises significant personal privacy issues by mandating the 
disclosure of an employee's parental status, the schools attended by an employee's 
5
 In support of its prohibition argument, the City does rely upon Pub Off Law §30.4(3). 
Even if that statute was applicable to the City, however, the residency requirement 
would be nonmandatory,'and not prohibited. See, City of Mount Vernon, 18 PERB 
U3020 (1985); Salamanca Police Unit, CSEA, 12 PERB P079 (1979). 
626PERBP025(1993). 
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children and the employee's voter registration status. Unlike the City's former practice, 
each employee suspected of violating the residency requirement is now required to 
state whether he or she has applied for and received a property tax exemption. 
Furthermore, each suspect employee must attach a driver's license and/or vehicle 
registration, bank statements and income tax returns to the affidavit. 
Finally, we deny the City's exception to the ALJ's proposed remedial order. 
Pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, PERB has broad remedial authority to order make-
whole relief including ordering a party to cease and desist from engaging in an improper 
practice, and to order such affirmative relief that will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the ALJ's proposed remedial order, 
as modified.7 - • ' 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City: 
1. rescind and cease enforcement or implementation of the requirement that unit 
employees complete the "Affidavit of City Residence"; 
2. remove and destroy all reports or other documents submitted by unit 
employees or generated by the City or its agents pursuant to its requirement 
that they complete, swear to, sign and return the "Affidavit of City Residence" 
from any files kept or maintained by the City or any of its agents; 
3. reinstate and make whole, with interest at the maximum legal rate, any unit 
employees who were terminated based on their failure to complete the 
7
 We have modified the remedial order to the extent of requiring the City to post the 
attached notice at all physical and electronic locations normally used to communicate 
with unit employees. See, State of New York, 43 PERB 1J3046 (2010); State of New 
York (Dept of Correctional Services), 43 PERB 1J3035 (2010); NYCTA, 43 PERB TJ3038 
(2010). 
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"Affidavit of City Residence" or who were terminated based on the 
information they provided to the City in that affidavit; 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: May 27, 2011 
Albany, New York 
A '/jti7y<— 
Jerome Lefkgwrtz, Chairperson 
"7 
<2_ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
) 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Syracuse in the unit represented by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the 
City of Syracuse will forthwith: 
1. not enforce or implement the requirement that unit employees complete 
the "Affidavit of City Residence"; 
2. remove and destroy all reports or other documents submitted by unit 
employees or generated by the City or its agents pursuant to its requirement 
that they complete, swear to, sign and return the "Affidavit of City Residence" 
from any files kept or maintained by the City or any of its agents; 
3. reinstate and make whole, with interest at the maximum legal rate, any unit 
employees who were terminated based on their failure to complete the 
"Affidavit of City Residence" or who were terminated based on the information 
they provided to the City in that affidavit. ' 
Dated . By . 
on behalf of City of Syracuse 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA FALLS POLICE CLUB, INC., 
Charging Party, . 
CASE NO. U-29287 
- and -
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM E. GRANDE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
CRAIG H. JOHNSON, CORPORATION COUNSEL (CHRISTOPHER M. 
MAZUR of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Niagara Falls 
(City) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed by the Niagara Falls Police Club, Inc. (Police Club) alleging 
that the City violated §209-a:1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally implemented an amendment to its residency rules by eliminating the 
procedure for reinstatement of a unit employee after reestablishment of residency and 
the right of reinstatement to the employee's position, if vacant. 
, • • On a stipulated record, the ALJ concluded that the subject matters of the 
amended charge constitute mandatory subjects of negotiations under the Act, and that 
the City violated the Act by unilaterally implementing the amendment to its residency 
rules.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
The City excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the subject matters of the charge 
1
 44 P-ERB 114510 (2011V 
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are mandatory subjects of negotiations rather than a non-mandatory pre-employment 
qualifications. In addition, it asserts that the Police Club waived its right to negotiate the 
subjects based upon its failure to demand negotiations. Finally, the City contends that 
the at-issue subjects constitute prohibited subjects of negotiations. The Police Club 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The Police Club represents a unit of Niagara Falls Police Department employees 
including uniformed police officers, detectives, communication technicians and police 
dispatchers. The City and the Police Club are parties to a collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement) for the period January 1, 2004-December 31, 2007. 
In 1984, the Niagara Falls City Council (City Council) enacted a Local Law 
imposing a residency requirement for all new City employees. Pursuant to §5 of the 
Local Law, an employee found to have violated the residency requirement is deemed to 
have voluntarily resigned from his or her position. Upon reestablishing residency, 
' however, the employee is entitled to reinstatement to his or her former position if the 
position is vacant. 
In 1996, the City Council amended §5 slightly to read, in part: 
Should the City Administrator decide that the employee is a 
non-resident in violation of this local law, the employee shall 
be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from employment. 
Upon establishing residency, an individual so resigned may 
apply for reinstatement to his or her former position and shall 
be reinstated if the position is vacant. 
On March. 9, 2009, the City Council enacted legislation that deleted the sentence 
in §5 with respect to employee reinstatement following reestablishment of residency. On 
March120, 2009, the City of Niagara Falls Mayor (Mayor) approved the amendment and 
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it was subsequently filed with the New York Secretary of State. It is undisputed that the 
amendment was approved and implemented by the Mayor without negotiations with the 
' Police Club. 
DISCUSSION 
In City of Niagara Falls,2 we held that an appeal procedure for challenging an 
initial City determination that a unit member is not in compliance with the City's 
residency requirement is a mandatory subject. Our.decision was premised upon the 
fact that such a determination by the City adversely affects an employee's terms and 
conditions of employment because the determination results in the employee being 
deemed to have voluntarily resigned. 
In the present case, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the subjects of the Police 
Club's charge are mandatory subjects of negotiations under the Act. A procedure for 
the reinstatement of a unit employee following the reestablishment of residency, and the 
right to be reinstated to a former position if it is vacant, constitute benefits equivalent to 
preferential recall procedures that we have found to be mandatorily negotiable.3 
Contrary to the City's argument, the at-issue subjects are not pre-employment 
qualifications, but rather benefits for unit employees who retain a continuing nexus to 
City employment despite being deemed to have resigned for violating the residency 
requirement. 
We also affirm the ALJ's rejection of the City's argument that it did not have a 
duty to negotiate these mandatory subjects under the Act because the Police Club did 
not demand negotiations. While a demand is a necessary precondition to an obligation 
2
 43 PERB 1J3006 (2010). 
3
 Somers Faculty Assoc, 9 PERB fl3014 (1976). 
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under the Act to negotiate the impact of an employer's decision,4 the duty to negotiate a 
change in a mandatory subject of negotiations does not require a demand.5 
Finally, we examine the City's argument that Public Officers Law §30.4(3) 
renders the at-issue subjects prohibited under the Act. 
We have previously held that the imposition of a residency requirement for police 
officers subject to Public Officers Law §30.4(3) is nonmandatory because it constitutes 
the exercise of a managerial prerogative.6 By its explicit terms, however, Public Officers 
Law §30.4(3) is applicable to a police force consisting of "less than two hundred full-time 
members." In the present case, the stipulated record does not include an essential fact 
necessary to support the City's argument that unit members are subject to that state 
law: the police force has fewer than 200 full-time members.7 Therefore, the City has 
failed to demonstrate that the law is applicable to Police Club unit members. 
Even if we found Public Officers Law §30.4(3) to be applicable, the subject of the 
charge is not rendered prohibited or nonmandatory.by the statute. The plain and clear 
7 
language of Public Officers Law §30.4(3) grants certain localities the right to unilaterally 
impose a residency requirement on its police officers. The statute, however, does not 
contain language that explicitly or implicitly prohibits negotiations over related 
.
4
 North Babylon Union Free Sch Dist, 7 PERB P027 (1974). 
5
 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 40 PERB 1J3002 (2007); 
Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist, 28 PERB 1J3030 (1995). 
6
 City of Mount Vernon, 18 PERB fl3020 (1985); Salamanca Police Unit, CSEA, 12 . 
PERB U3079(1979). 
7
 Although the City asserts in its brief that it employs fewer than 200 full-time police 
officers, this factual assertion is unsupported by the stipulated record. As we have 
previously emphasized, parties bear responsibility to ensure a complete record, either 
through a stipulation of facts or through the presentation of evidence at a hearing. City 
of Niagara Falls, supra, note 2. 
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• procedures and rights with respect to satisfying the residency requirement imposed by 
the City. Public Officers Law §30.4(3) is simply not "so unequivocal a directive to take 
certain action that it leaves no room for bargaining."8 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally implementing the amendment to the 
residency law eliminating the procedure and right to reinstatement of an 
employee to his or her position upon the re-establishment of residency if 
the position remains vacant; 
2. Forthwith extend to any employee deemed to have resigned pursuant to 
the residency law the right to reinstatement upon re-establishing residency 
if his or her position, remains vacant; 
3. Forthwith negotiate the elimination of the language of the residency law • 
regarding reinstatement with the Police Club; and 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate both in writing and electronically, with unit employees. 
DATED: May 27, 2011 
• Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkow/tz, Chakpafson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
s
 Board ofEduc of City Sch Dist of City of New York v New York State Pub EmpI Rel 
Bd, 75 NY2d 660 at 668, 23 PERB fl7013 at 7014 (1990). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
Stop unilaterally implementing the amendment to the residency law 
eliminating the procedure and right to reinstatement of an employee to his 
or her positions upon the re-establishment of residency if the position 
remains vacant; . -
2. Forthwith extend tetany employee deemed to have resigned pursuant to 
the residency law the right to reinstatement upon re-establishing residency 
if his or her position remains vacant; 
3. Forthwith negotiate the elimination of the language of the residency law 
regarding reinstatement with the Police Club. 
Dated . . . . . ' By . . . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
City of Niagara Falls 
1. 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
TIOGA COUNTY LOCAL 854, TIOGA 
COUNTY EMPLOYEES UNIT 8850, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27939 
-and -
COUNTY OF TIOGA, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (DAREN J. RYLEWICZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HOGAN, SARZYNSKI, LYNCH, SUROWKA & DEWIND, LLP (EDWARD J. 
) SARZYNSKI of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
. Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that 
the County of Tioga (County) violated §§20.9-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it disciplined six unit members, including the CSEA 
unit president and shop steward, for engaging in protected activity under the Act, and 
when it sought to discipline the unit president and shop steward more severely than the 
other four unit members. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge, concluding 
) that the at-issue activities of the six unit employees were not protected under the Act. 
In addition, the ALJ determined that the County had demonstrated legitimate 
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nondiscriminatory reasons for seeking greater disciplinary penalties against the CSEA 
unit president and the shop steward. Finally, the ALJ credited the testimony of the 
County personnel director who testified that she was not aware that one of the six unit 
employees was a shop steward, at the time that the County entered into settlement 
discussions with CSEA over the disciplinary claims against the six employees.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, CSEA asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that the at-issue 
activities of the six unit employees were not protected under the Act, in crediting the 
County personnel director's testimony that she was unaware of the shop steward's 
status when the parties commenced settlement discussions, and in finding that the 
unequal punishment of the unit president and shop steward did not violate §§209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Act. The County supports the decision of the ALJ, and asserts there are 
no legal or factual bases for reversing the ALJ's decision. , • ' 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision, as modified herein. , 
FACTS 
Joan Kellogg (Kellogg) works for the County Health Department. She has been 
CSEA unit president for a county-wide unit since July 1, 2005. At all times relevant, 
Penny Sjndoni (Sindoni) was a Health Department senior typist and a CSEA shop 
steward. In 2007, Kellogg sent an email to County Personnel Officer Bethany O'Rourke 
(O'Rourke) with a list of unit employees who were shop stewards including Sindoni. 
During her tenure as unit president, Kellogg processed a number of grievances 
including a class action grievance regarding the County's flexible schedule policy that 
1
 43 PERB TJ4521 (2010). 
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~A was settled at arbitration. In addition, Kellogg discussed other concerns directly with 
County Personnel Officer O'Rourke, although regular labor-management meetings 
between the County and CSEA had been discontinued. 
In late 2005, Kellogg began receiving verbal complaints from unit member Linda 
Cook (Cook) about alleged abusive workplace conduct by Cook's new immediate 
supervisor Christeenia A. Cargill (Cargill), the County Health Department Director of 
Children with Special Health Gare Needs, who had been hired earlier in the year. A few 
months later, unit members Kimberly DeRouchie (DeRouchie) and Gail Barton (Barton) 
made similar verbal complaints to Kellogg about Cargill's alleged behavior. Cook, 
DeRouchie and Barton also complained to shop steward Sindoni that Cargill was 
verbally abusive and that she slammed doors and glared at people. 
v In August 2006, County Personnel Officer O'Rourke, County Health Department 
Director Johannes Peeters(Peeters) and County Director of Administrative Services 
Denis McCann (McCann) met with Kellogg and CSEA Labor Relations Specialist 
Shawn Lucas (Lucas) to discuss problems involving Kellogg's job performance. The 
meeting resulted in an agreement that Kellogg would meet more regularly with McCann 
to review her workload. 
In the summer 2006, Kellogg scheduled a meeting with CSEA Labor Relations 
Specialist Lucas regarding complaints against Cargill. Present at the meeting were 
Kellogg and unit members Cook, DeRouchie and Barton. Following that meeting, 
CSEA participated in a series of meetings with County Personnel Officer O'Rourke and 
County Health Department Director Peeters regarding Cargill in late 2006 and 2007. 
Lucas or CSEA unit vice-president Lisa Baker (Baker) attended those meetings on 
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behalf of CSEA along with Cook and DeRouchie.2 Kellogg, Sindoni and Cargill did not 
attend the meetings.. 
O'Rourke and DeRouchie were the only participants at the County-CSEA 
meetings who testified before the ALJ.3 They testified that at the meetings Cook and 
DeRouchie expressed frustration with Cargill's supervision and job performance. The 
issues discussed included Cargill's failure to return client telephone calls, her delays in 
completing Cook's evaluation and Cargill's allegation against Cook for breaching 
confidentiality. There is no evidence in the record that the CSEA representatives or the 
unit members complained at the meetings that Cargill had engaged in verbal abuse, 
slammed doors or that CSEA invoked the County's workplace violence policy 
prohibiting disruptive, menacing, threatening arid abusive behavior. At one of the 
meetings with CSEA, O'Rourke referred to the complaints by DeRouchie and Cook as 
"childish" and between meetings County Health Department Director Peeters spoke 
with Cargill about her conduct toward them. 
The result of the County-CSEA meetings was the County's adoption of CSEA's 
proposal that the County conduct a training session in conflict resolution for all Health 
Department employees. Consistent with that agreement, the County offered the conflict 
resolution training to unit members.4 The record does not include any evidence that 
CSEA Labor Relations Specialist Lucas and unit vice-president Baker took any further 
2
 Barton resigned from County employment in April 2007. Transcript, p. 29. 
3
 Both were called as County witnesses. CSEA did not call Labor Relations Specialist 
Lucas, unit vice president Baker-or unit member Cook to testify. 
4
 The training took place in 2007 and not in 2006 as found by the ALJ. Supra, note 1, 
43 PERB H4521 at 4580. 
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f "~\ action with respect to the issues raised regarding Cargill following the County-CSEA 
meetings. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Lucas or Baker engaged in any 
further communications with DeRouchie and Cook or reported the results of the 
meetings to Kellogg and Sindoni. 
In May 2007, DeRouchie, Cook, Sindoni and co-worker Lisa Schumacher 
(Schumacher) began wearing a pink ribbon at work. The pink ribbon was similar to the 
pink ribbon symbol worn for breast cancer awareness. The activity was originally 
proposed by DeRouchie to show symbolic support for her and Cook. During a 
disciplinary interrogation conducted by the County in August 2007, Sindoni stated that 
the ribbon wearing was intended to "show support for each other and we agreed we 
would do that because Kim [DeRouchie] was upset because Gail [Barton] quit."5 
v In May 2007, Kellogg, Sindoni, DeRouchie, Schumacher and Cook had dinner 
with their former co-worker Barton. At the time, Kellogg did not wear the pink ribbon. 
During the course of their dinner discussion, the phrase "I Hate Teena Club" was 
utilized to refer to those wearing the ribbon. Kellogg testified before the ALJ that 
DeRouchie, Cook and Barton expressed hatred for Cargill at the dinner, and that 
Kellogg viewed Cargill as stupid and incompetent. At some point, unit member Katie 
Searles (Searles), who was not present at the dinner, began wearing the ribbon at work 
as well. 
On May 22, 2007, after Kellogg became upset over Cargill's conduct toward her 
and Sindoni, Kellogg made a personal complaint to County Director of Administrative 
Services Denis McCann (McCann). In addition, she began to wear the ribbon. Kellogg 
^ i • — ' " 
Respondent Exhibit 25, pp. 9-10. This statement was added by Sindoni as part of her 
handwritten amendments to the interrogation transcript. 
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testified before the ALJ that she started wearing the ribbon "in support for everyone 
else because I hadn't taken a stand, I tried to stay clear of those issues."6 At her 
interrogation in August 2007, however, Kellogg emphasized that the ribbon wearing had 
a symbolic personal purpose: 
It was intended to give me support for myself because 
I felt very intimidated and very, it was for my, to make me 
feel better because I felt so terrible.7 
On the same day Kellogg began to wear the pink ribbon, she spoke with County 
Administrative Assistant Barbara McCormick (McCormick) about her recent interaction 
with Gargill. During their conversation, Kellogg showed McCormick the ribbon and 
stated that it represented the "I Hate Teena Club."8 McCormick testified that she 
declined Kellogg's offer to join the club, and "laughed it off."9 Although Kellogg denied 
attempting to recruit McCormick, Kellogg admitted telling McCormick that she would 
also hate Cargill after working with her. McCormick reported Kellogg's comments 
about the "I Hate Teena Club" to County Director of Administrative Services McCann. 
McCann learned that other employees in the Health Department were aware of the 
existence of the so-called club. 
After consulting with County Personnel Officer O'Rourke and County Health 
Department Director Peeters, County Director of Administrative Services McCann 
commenced an investigation on May 25, 2007. Over the next several months, McCann 
6
 Transcript, pp. 41, 55. 
7
 Respondent Exhibit 24, p. 14. 
8
 Transcript, pp. 60, 211; Respondent Exhibit 24, p. 15. 
9
 Transcript, pp. 211-212. 
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prepared a written statement for each employee he interviewed and forwarded the 
signed statements to O'Rourke. During the interviews, McCann asked each employee 
questions regarding their level of knowledge about the "club," including which 
employees were members, whether they were solicited to join the club, and whether the 
ribbon was an indication of club membership. 
McCann separately interviewed County employees Mary Gelatt (Gelatt), Nancy 
Dow (Dow) and Roxie Canavan (Canavan) on May 25, 2007; he interviewed McCormick 
and two other County employees during the following week. All of the employees 
interviewed by McCann stated that they knew about the club and the related ribbon 
wearing. McCormick informed McCann that Kellogg solicited her to join; Gelatt 
revealed that she had been solicited by Sindoni. 
Over Memorial Day weekend, Kellogg learned that County employees were 
being questioned about the club and the ribbons. In response, she telephoned former 
CSEA unit president Kathleen McEwen (McEwen) to find out whether McEwen thought. 
the six employees might be disciplined for their conduct. During the conversation, 
McEwen expressed her opinion that the employees might face discipline.10 Kellogg 
also telephoned Labor Relations Specialist Lucas about the ribbons. Lucas 
recommended that the employees stop wearing them. 
Based upon the advice received from McEwen and Lucas, Kellogg called 
Sindoni on May 29, 2007 to encourage her and the others to stop wearing the ribbons. 
Kellogg stated during her interrogation that she called only Sindoni "because I knew 
Linda [Cook] was not at work and Kim [DeRouchie] is frequently hard to get to. I don't 
10
 Transcript pp. 194-195.. 
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know Lisa [Schumacher] or Katie's [Searles] numbers."11 Thereafter, the ribbon 
wearing ceased. 
In late June 2007, during a conversation with CSEA local president Lynn Wool 
(Wool) regarding an unrelated union matter, Cargill first learned of the existence of a 
"hate club"12 Wool mentioned the so-called club in the context of inquiring about how 
Cargill was feeling. Thereafter, Cargill obtained additional information from a co-worker 
about the purpose of the ribbons that Cargill had previously observed being worn by 
DeRouchie, Cook, Schumacher, Searles and Sindoni. Cargill met with Peeters, who 
informed her that the County had been investigating the issue but delayed notifying her 
to avoid unnecessarily upsetting her. Cargill also telephoned former CSEA unit 
president McEwen to express her displeasure and fear over the conduct of the other 
employees. 
In July 2007, Cargill prepared and submitted a threat summary to the County 
under its workplace violence policy. Following receipt ofCargiirs complaint, the County 
Attorney and O'Rourke commenced their own investigation. The investigation included 
interviews with Cargill, McCormick, Gelatt and other County employees. 
During her interview, McCormick reported that Kellogg hated Cargill and Cargill's 
predecessor, and repeated that Kellogg had asked her to join the club. She also stated 
that Sindoni described herself as vindictive and as someone who would retaliate 
against anyone who provided truthful information to McCann. McCormick also stated 
that she and her co-workers feared Sindoni because of Sindoni's anger and 
11
 Respondent Exhibit 24, p. 26. 
12
 Joint Exhibit 12, p. 250. 
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vindictiveness, a sentiment also expressed by Cargill in a separate interview. Gelatt 
repeated to O'Rourke and the County Attorney that Sindoni solicited her to join the club. 
She also reported that Sindoni became very angry when she learned that Gelatt had 
provided truthfulinformation to McCann. 
As part of the investigation, the County Attorney and O'Rourke interrogated 
Kellogg, Sindoni, DeRouchie, Cook, Schumacher and Searles on August 17, 2007. 
Following those interrogations, O'Rourke recommended that each employee be 
disciplined. The proposed punishments varied, however, based upon O'Rourke's 
judgment of each employee's specific conduct, cooperation during the investigation and 
expression of remorse. 
Consistent with O'Rourke's recommendations, the County presented proposed 
disciplinary settlements to Lucas. The penalties proposed for Kellogg and Sindoni were 
the most severe: a four-week suspension and termination respectively. The County 
proposed letters of reprimand for Searles, Schumacher and DeRouchie, and a two-
week suspension without pay for Cook. All of the employees would also be required to 
personally apologize to Cargill. 
Following a request from Lucas, Q'Rourke sent an email outlining the County's 
rationale for seeking different penalties. Among the stated reasons for seeking a more 
severe penalty against Kellogg was the allegation that Kellogg solicited others to join. 
the club. The County subsequently modified its settlement offers by reducing the 
proposed suspension of Cook to one-week and increasing the proposed penalty of 
DeRouchie from a letter of reprimand to a one-week suspension. 
DeRouchie, Cook, Schumacher and Searles accepted the settlement offers and, 
with CSEA's representation, entered into stipulations of settlement without the County 
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filing disciplinary charges pursuant to Civil Service Law §75. DeRouchie and Cook 
agreed to one-week suspensions for participating in the club, for wearing the ribbon and 
for creating a hostile work environment for Cargill. Searles and Schumacher accepted 
a letter of reprimand for being a club member and for wearing the ribbon. 
After Kellogg refused to accept the County's settlement offer, she was served 
with Civil Service Law §75 charges seeking her termination for creating a hostile work 
environment and violating the County's workplace violence policy. The charges 
included detailed allegations regarding the wide scope of Kellogg's involvement with the 
club and the ribbons. Furthermore, the specifications alleged that Kellogg misused the 
County's email system in July and August 2007 to send derogatory email regarding 
Cargill and Peeters. Kellogg was also charged with certain job performance 
deficiencies that had already been resolved with the County. Kellogg entered into a 
settlement of the disciplinary charges, which was negotiated by CSEA. Under the 
settlement terms, Kellogg accepted a suspension without pay from October 2, 2007 to 
October 31, 2007 for participating in the club, recruiting new members, wearing the 
ribbon and creating a hostile work environment for Cargill. As part of the settlement, 
Kellogg also agreed to a written warning regarding her job performance. 
The County maintained its position that Sindoni should either resign or face 
disciplinary charges seeking her termination. According to O'Rourke's testimony, the 
severity of the proposed penalty was premised upon Sindoni having engaged in more 
serious acts of misconduct. 
In late September 2007, the County issued Civil Service Law §75 charges 
against Sindoni setting forth 16 specific acts of misconduct or incompetence, which the 
County alleged created a hostile work environment and violated its workplace violence 
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policy. Among the 16 specifications were allegations that she participated in the club, 
wore the ribbon and recruited others to join. In addition, the charges alleged that she 
had a loud argument with Cargill, monitored Cargill's workplace errors, conversations 
and actions, retaliated against co-workers for speaking to the County about the club, 
expressed disappointment to a co-worker for failing to lie, and made threats that caused 
co-workers to fear retaliation from her for participating in the County's investigation. ' 
After a hearing, the Civil Service Law §75 hearing officer found Sindoni guilty of 
the charges and recommended her termination, which the County adopted. An Article 
78 proceeding was filed challenging the termination, which resulted in the Appellate 
Division, Third Department upholding the termination.13 
DISCUSSION 
To demonstrate that the County's disciplinary actions were improperly motivated 
in violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, CSEA has the burden of demonstrating 
by a preponderance of evidence that: a) the affected unit employees engaged in a 
protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was known to the person or persons 
taking the adverse employment action; and c) the adverse employment action would 
' A A 
not have been taken "but for" the protected activity. 
In its exceptions, CSEA asserts that the six unit employees engaged in protected 
activity under the Act when they wore pink ribbons at work. We disagree. 
13
 Sindoni v County of Tioga, 67 AD3d 1183 (3d Dept 2009). . 
uElwood Union Free Sch Dist, 43 PERB 1J3012 (2010); UFT (Jenkins) 41 PERB 1J3007 
(2008), confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v New York State Pub Emp Rel Bd, 41 PERB 
117007 (Sup Ct New York County 2008) affirmed 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB 1J7008 (1st 
Dept 2009); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB fl3012 (1985); Town of Independence, 23 
PERB 1J3Q20 (1990); County of Orleans, 25 PERB T[3010 (1992); Stockbridge Valley 
Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB ^3007 (1993); County of Wyoming, 34 PERB 1T3042 (2001). 
Case No. U-27939 - 1 2 -
The scope of protected employee activities under §§202 and 203 of the Act is 
narrower than the scope of activities protected under §7 of National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).15 This difference in the scope of statutory protections emanates from the fact 
that unlike §7 of the NLRA, the Act does not protect employees who engage in 
concerted activities for "mutual aid and protection,"16 Therefore, in order for conduct to 
be found to be a protected concerted activity for purposes of the Act, it must have some 
relationship with forming, joining or participating in an employee organization. 
To determine whether a particular activity is protected under the Act we evaluate 
"the totality of all relevant circumstances, with a focus upon the purpose and effect of 
that activity."17 As part of that evaluation, we must examine the content of the activity in 
the context of all relevant surrounding circumstances. 
. Employee statements and actions that are organized, prompted or encouraged 
by an employee organization will, in general, be found to be protected concerted activity 
for purposes of the Act. The wide scope of protected concerted activities under the Act 
includes statements and activities by a unit employee as part of an employee 
organizational activity, relates to an employee organization policy, involves employee 
organizational representation or stems from a dispute emanating from a collectively 
15
 29 USC §157. See also, Rosen v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 72 NY2d 42, 21 
PERB H7014 (1988); NYCTA vNew York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 8 NY3d 226, 40 
PERB 1J7001 (2007); Love Canal Area Revitalization Agency (Bannister), 28 PERB 
113040(1995). 
16
 29 USC §157. ^ 
17
 Village of Scotia, 29 PERB H3071, at 3169 (1996), confirmed sub nom. Village of 
Scotia v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 241 AD2d 29, 31 PERB fl7008 (3d Dept 
1998). See also, Metropolitan Suburban BusAuth (Lomuscio), 23 PERB 1J30Q6 (1990); 
NYCTA (Alston), 20 PERB. 1J4575 (1987) affd 20 PERB fl3065 (1987). 
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negotiated agreement.18 In such contexts, the concerted wearing of ribbons and other 
symbolic forms of speech or protest by. unit members will be generally protected under 
the Act, particularly when employees are permitted to wear ribbons or other emblems at 
work in support of other causes. 
Based upon the facts and circumstances presented in this record, however, we 
conclude that the wearing of pink ribbons by the six unit employees is not protected 
concerted activity under the Act. The record evidence demonstrates that while the 
ribbon wearing was concerted, in the generic sense, it was unrelated to forming, joining 
or participating in an employee organization. Instead, the symbolie speech was for the 
purpose of expressing only a shared personal animus regarding Cargill, a sign of 
camaraderie tied to that dislike and an expression of support for each other. 
The ribbon wearing commenced only after CSEA completed its meetings with 
the County, which resulted in the conflict resolution training. The activity was not 
related to any ongoing CSEA representation. It did not stem from the terms of the 
collectively negotiated agreement or a pending claim under the County's workplace 
violence policy. Nor was it part of a symbolic campaign against the County or Cargill for 
allegedly failing to comply with the County's policy. 
In reaching our conclusions, we infer from CSEA's failure to call Labor Relations 
• • • ' • ' ' ; • . 
Specialist Lucas and unit vice president Baker as witnesses that.they would have 
18
 In certain limited circumstances, conduct in the workplace with a nexus to 
organizational activity may be found unprotected under the Act but only when the 
objective evidence demonstrates that under the totality of the circumstances it is 
overzealous, confrontational or actually disruptive. State of New York (Division of 
Parole), 41 PERB fl3033 (2008). To prove that defense, however, an employer must 
present objective evidence of disruption emanating from the conduct. It cannot rely 
upon a mere prediction of disruption or a workplace disruption caused by its own 
overreaction to the at-issue conduct. 
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testified that they were unaware of the ribbon wearing until after the County 
commenced its investigation, that the activity was not related to their discussions with 
the County regarding unit employees' complaints and that in their judgment the conflict 
resolution training adequately resolved the employee complaints about Cargill's 
supervision.19 
The evidence demonstrates that CSEA did not organize or encourage the 
symbolic conduct by the six unit members. While Kellogg and Sindoni hold CSEA 
offices, the context of their -involvement demonstrates that they did not wear the 
ribbons, or encourage others to do so, in their union capacities. Rather, they wore the 
ribbons because of their strong personal dislike of Cargill. Kellogg began wearing the 
ribbon only after a direct incident with Cargill, which resulted in Kellogg filing a "personal 
complaint"20 with McCann. During her interrogation, Sindoni candidly acknowledged 
her continued dislike for Cargill, which stemmed, in part, from a dress code complaint 
she made against Cargill.21 Furthermore, we note that Kellogg and Sindoni did not cite 
to their CSEA titles, duties or activities during their respective interrogations or in their 
subsequent handwritten amendments to the interrogation transcripts. 
We next turn to CSEA's exception challenging the ALJ's crediting of O'Rourke's 
testimony that she was unaware of Sindoni's shop steward status at the time that the 
County decided upon the disciplinary penalties it would seek including Sindoni's 
resignation or termination. 
'<, 
19
 State of New York (Division of Parole), supra, note 18. 
20
 Brief of Charging Party in Support of Exceptions, p.3. 
21
 Respondent Exhibit 25, pp.-11-12. 
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Credibility determinations by an ALJ are generally entitled to substantial 
deference by the Board.22 In the present case, we find no objective evidence in the 
record to disturb the ALJ's credibility finding that O'Rourke did not recall-Sindoni's shop 
steward status at the time that the County commenced settlement discussions with 
CSEA. While Kellogg may have included Sindoni on a list of shop stewards emailed to 
O'Rourke, it is quite plausible that O'Rourke may have forgotten the content of that 
email, particularly when Sindoni had no interactions with O'Rourke in her shop steward 
role and Sindoni did not mention her CSEA status during her interrogation. Based upon 
the foregoing, we deny CSEA's second exception. 
Finally, we examine CSEA's exception seeking to overturn the ALJ's finding that 
the more severe disciplinary penalties sought against Kellogg and Sindoni were 
motivated by their status in CSEA in violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that CSEA failed to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the disciplinary penalties were 
motivated by Kellogg and Sindoni's organizational status or activities. 
With respect.to Sindoni, CSEA failed to prove an essential element of its prima 
facie case: that the County was cognizant of her status as a shop steward at the time it 
decided to seek her resignation or discharge. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's decision 
dismissing the amended charge as it relates to the disciplinary penalty against Sindoni. 
Even if we were to reach a different conclusion on the issue of the County's 
knowledge, however, we would find that the respective punishments sought by the 
County were not improperly motivated. 
22
 Mount Morris Cent Sen Dist, 41 PERB 1J3020 (2008). 
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The pursuit of more severe penalties against the two CSEA officers is not 
dispositive proof of improper motivation.23 Those disparities, as well as the resurrection 
of other job performance issues regarding Kellogg, and Sindoni's prior work history 
constitute circumstantial evidence of improper motivation.24 However, the County 
presented legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions demonstrating that 
Kellogg and Sindoni were not similarly situated to the other four unit members. The 
evidence reveals that the County sought harsher penalties against them because their 
alleged misconduct was of a greater magnitude than that committed by the other 
employees. Both were reported to have solicited others to participate and Sindoni was 
accused of making threats that created fear among her co-workers and engaging in 
other misconduct toward Cargill. The fact that Cargill may have feared both Sindoni 
and DeRouchie does not demonstrate that the County's reasons for seeking harsher 
penalties against Kellogg and Sindoni were pretextual. 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed as modified. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that CSEA's exceptions are denied, and the 
charge is dismissed. 
DATED: May 27, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkoytfftz, Chaij^erson 
Sheila S. Cole, Board Member 
23
 County of Cattaraugus, 24 PERB H3001 (1991). 
24
 Hudson Valley Comm Coll, 25 PERB P039 (1992). 
